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Abstract 
In Vietnam, SMEs account for up to 98% of the total number of enterprises. They contribute about 48% to the coun-
try’s GDP, 20% to export value and provide jobs for 77% of the country’s labor force. However, majority of the SMEs 
are micro enterprises with very limited access to resources such as advanced technology and formal credit, etc. Despite 
their significant contributions to social and economic development, SMEs are often regarded as “the missing middle” ? 
they are usually not the subject of interest for commercial banks while their loans might be too large to borrow from 
microfinance institutions. This study surveys SMEs credit accessibility, identify the factors that affect their credit access, and 
the interest rate charged on their loan in Vietnam. Primary data are obtained from a survey of 487 SMEs in Hanoi in June 
2013. Logistic regression is used to determine SMEs’ ability to access to credit and ordinary least square to estimate the in-
terest rate charged on the SMEs largest loan. The results show owner characteristics, educational level and gender are the 
most important factors in determining the access to credit, followed by SMEs relationship with banks and customers. With 
regards to the loan interest rate, the owner characteristics variables are non-significant. The most expensive source of financ-
ing is from private money lender, followed by commercial bank loan and microfinance. 
Keywords: credit accessibility, SME, informal finance, loans, Vietnam. 
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Introduction? 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) play a 
crucial role in economic development, both in de-
veloping and developed countries. The contribution 
of SMEs to the economy can be seen through the 
value added every year generated by SMEs such as 
employment, export participation, poverty allevia-
tion, women empowerment, etc. In low income 
countries, it is undeniable that most of the enterpris-
es are small scale and their labor force also works 
mostly for small enterprises. For example, 80-90% 
enterprises in developing Asia are SMEs and attract 
50-80% of total employment (Tambunan, 2008). 
Many studies have found that SMEs create more 
jobs than large enterprises (de Kok et al., 2011) 
because SMEs are labor-intensive (Hobohm, 2001). 
According to a report from the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary 
(2011), in Southeast Asia (SEA), SMEs accounts 
for more than 92% of total enterprises in all mem-
ber countries. They also create a significant number 
of jobs, ranging from 56% in Malaysia to 97% in 
Indonesia. In terms of contribution to country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), SMEs make up for 
60% GDP in Singapore, 56.63% in Indonesia, and 
about 20 to 40% in the other SEA countries. 
In Vietnam, SMEs account for up to 98% of the 
total number of enterprises. They contribute about 
48% to the country’s GDP (MPI, 2012) and 20% to 
export value (ESCAP, 2011). SMEs provide jobs 
for 77% of the country’s labor force (ESCAP, 
2011). However, majority of the SMEs are micro 
enterprises with very limited access to resources 
such as advanced technology and formal credit, etc. 
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Despite their significant contributions to social and 
economic development, SMEs are often regarded as 
“the missing middle” ? they are usually not the subject 
of interest for commercial banks while their loans 
might be too large to borrow from microfinance insti-
tutions. Data collected from SMEs Manufacturing 
Survey 2009 showed that out of 2654 surveyed SMEs, 
37.6% have applied for bank loans while 62.4% ap-
plied for informal sources. Of the 997 SMEs that ap-
plied for formal loans, 22% reported having problem 
in obtaining the loan while 40% of the remaining 1657 
SMEs that used informal loans chose informal credi-
tors because of flexible payback condition. A report 
from the Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Invest-
ment (2012) also shows that up to 30% of SMEs were 
unable to access financing while the other 30% can 
but faced many difficulties. 
Given the important role of SMEs in development, 
their difficulty in financing, the claim that lacks of 
financing adversely affect their performance. This 
study surveys SMEs credit accessibility, identifies the 
factors that affect their credit access, and the interest 
rate charged on their loan. The study provides a deep 
insight into the SMEs credit access situation and the 
results from empirical models will help to enhance 
SMEs credit accessibility.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
one provides a review of the literature on the determi-
nants of credit accessibility. Section 2 gives the me-
thodology. Section 3 presents empirical results. The 
final section concludes the paper. 
1. Literature review  
There are several constraints that impede the per-
formance of SMEs in Vietnam. These constraints 
include low quality of labor and technology, unfa-
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vorable business environment, modest capacity of 
owner/manager, and lack of financing. With regards 
to low quality of labor and technology, majority of 
SMEs in Vietnam operate under poor technology 
and low-skilled labor that result in their low produc-
tivity. Furthermore, the business environment in 
Vietnam remains unfavorable for the development 
of SMEs, particularly because of institutional and 
legal barriers. In developing countries such as Viet-
nam where the quality of institutions is low, SMEs 
find it very hard to obtain business license and es-
tablish their business as they have to go through a 
lot of procedures as well as regulations. Empirical 
evidence across countries has confirmed the impact 
of regulatory burden on SMEs development (Peci, 
Kutllovci, Tmava & Shala, 2012; Samitowska, 
2011). In 2012, Vietnam ranked 99 out of 185 coun-
tries and regions on ease of doing business, lagging 
behind East Asia and Pacific countries as a whole 
with a ranking of 76. The number of procedures to 
set up a business in Vietnam was nine in 2011 com-
pared to five in Thailand and four in Malaysia. Si-
milarly, the time required to start a business in 
Vietnam was 44 days while the latter is 29 and 6, 
respectively (Doing Business, World Bank Data-
base, 2012).  
Further the capacity of SMEs owners/managers is 
often low. Internal management of Vietnamese 
SMEs is often underdeveloped, unprofessional and 
weak that mainly based on the limited and personal 
experiences of the owners. There is usually no clear 
distinction between the rights and duties of owners, 
employers and employees. Most enterprises lack 
strategies and long-term business plans, and operate 
with poor trained professional staff (MPI, 2005,  
p. 16). In a survey conducted by CIEM in 2008, the 
majority of general education level completed by 
owners/managers is lower secondary (55%) and 
professional education level by elementary worker 
(22.6%). Only 19.8% surveyed owners/managers 
completed college/university study. 
However, the most important factor that impede the 
performance of SMEs in Vietnam is the lack of 
capital. SMEs are generally considered as riskier 
than large firms because they have lower survival 
rate, larger variance of profitability and growth 
(OECD, 1998). As a result, they often suffer from 
credit rationing or higher loan interest rate. In Viet-
nam, according to a recent research conducted by 
VCCI, 75% of the SMEs would like to seek bank 
loans but only about 30% succeeded. Not only is the 
lending procedure too complicated but the interest 
rate charged to SMEs is also exorbitantly high. 
SMEs in Vietnam are in greater disadvantage com-
pare to large enterprise in obtaining capital. For 
example, the average capital per enterprise was 49 
VND billion in 2011 for all enterprises (and 1582 
VND billion for state-owned enterprises which are 
mostly large enterprises) but it was only 18 VND 
billion for SMEs alone (GSO, 2013).   
Previous literature suggests that the determinants of 
SMEs accessibility to finance can be classified into 
four groups of variables: owner/manager characte-
ristics; SMEs characteristics; creditworthiness; and 
network. 
1.1. Owner/manager characteristics. Small scale 
firms are mostly managed by owners/managers and 
their performance depends largely on the management 
ability of the owners/managers. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that the owners/managers’ education and 
experience have been found to be strong determinants 
of credit accessibility. A large number of studies have 
found owner’s education and experience to enhance 
firm credit access positively, including Coleman 
(2004b), Fatoki & Odeyemi (2010), Irwin & Scott 
(2010), Fatoki & Asah (2011), Nofsinger and Wang 
(2011), and Osei-Assibey, Bokpin & Twerefou 
(2012). Research on the impact of owners/managers’ 
education and experience on accessibility to finance of 
SMEs in Vietnam, however, showed mixed results. 
Rand (2007) found that owner’s education is signifi-
cant but negatively related to credit accessibility be-
cause owners with better knowledge are more likely to 
know if their application will be rejected. Therefore, 
they choose not to apply for credit in the first place. 
This observation is consistent with Coleman’s (2004a) 
study. In contrast, Le, Sundar & Nguyen (2006) study 
showed educational positive influence the owner’s 
probability of obtaining bank loans. Interestingly, this 
relationship is non-significant in Thanh, Cuong, Dung 
& Chieu (2011) study. 
A set of owners/managers’ demographic characteris-
tics such as gender, age, and marital status is often 
added as controlled variables. In terms of the owner’s 
age, younger owners are considered less risk averse so 
they are more willing to borrow externally (Coleman, 
2004b; Vos, Yeh, Carter & Tagg, 2007). However, 
owner/manager’s age represents experience so young 
owners might find it harder to borrow formally (Ako-
ten, Sawada & Otsuka, 2006) and they might not ap-
ply for bank loans because they assume their applica-
tion would be rejected (Coleman, 2004a). Second, the 
literature on gender and entrepreneur revealed that 
women are likely to face significantly more difficulty 
in obtaining finance than men. They face higher prob-
ability of being credit rationed (Drakos & Giannako-
poulos, 2011; Muravyev, Talavera, & Schäfer, 2009), 
pay higher interest rate (Muravyev et al., 2009), obtain 
less amount of the loans to start their business and use 
less institutional finance (Sara & Peter, 1998) but 
more informal/microfinance (Akoten et al., 2006). On 
the other hand, some studies claimed that women in 
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the business world are better educated and more ta-
lented than men so they can borrow more from formal 
sources (Yaldiz, Altunbas & Bazzana, 2011) or there 
is no gender difference in financial accessibility (Fato-
ki & Asah, 2011; Harrison & Mason, 2007) and in 
some studies, women were found to have an advan-
tage in obtaining formal loans and rely less on infor-
mal loans. With regards to the SMEs in Vietnam, 
Rand’s (2007) finding is consistent with the former 
view, while Thanh et al. (2011) supports the latter. 
1.2. SMEs characteristics. SMEs share some com-
mon characteristics that differentiate their credit acces-
sibility from large firms. The first and most frequently 
cited characteristic is firm size (which is often proxied 
by number of employees or sales). SMEs are characte-
rized as the “missing middle” because on one hand, 
for banks, the amount lend to SMEs is too small to 
offset transaction and screening cost (Shinozaki, 
2012). On the other hand, the loan might be too large 
for the borrowers to borrow from microfinance institu-
tions (DALBERG, 2011). Hernández-Cánovas and 
Martínez-Solano’s (2010) study reported that small 
sized enterprises bear higher cost of debt than medium 
sized enterprises because asymmetric information is 
reduced when the firms become larger. Drakos & 
Giannakopoulos (2011) argued that firm size can sig-
nal loan repayment ability; therefore, small firms are 
more likely to be credit rationed. Similarly, in a study 
of credit constraints in four African countries, Bigsten 
et al. (2003) suggested that firm size is a strong deter-
minant in obtaining credit with the probability of suc-
cess of 31%, 20%, and 13% for micro, small, and 
medium sized firms, respectively, as compared to 
large firms. Another study by Hainz and Nabokin 
(2013) that covers 23 countries in the EU and Asia test 
the determinants of access to credit across different 
firm sizes. The authors’ result suggest that small firms 
have 6 percent point lower probability of demanding 
external finance than larger firms, indicating that small 
firms rely more on internal finance or have less credit 
demand than large firms. For the case of Vietnam, the 
current literature supports that firm size is positively 
associated with accessibility to bank loan (Le, 2012; 
Malesky & Taussig, 2009; Nguyen & Ramachandran, 
2006; Rand, 2007) and negatively with interest rate 
(Menkhoff, Neuberger, & Suwanaporn, 2006). 
Together with firm size, firm age has also been widely 
recognized as a significant determinant of accessibility 
to financing. Young firms often face difficulties in 
obtaining external finance because of informational 
disparities (Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 
2010; Kira & He, 2012), more difficulty to monitor 
(Byiers, Rand, Tarp, & Bentzen, 2010) and inexpe-
rience (Akoten et al., 2006). Result on the impact of 
firm age on credit accessibility for SMEs in Vietnam 
is mixed. Thanh et al. (2011) study showed a positive 
relationship while it was non-significant in Malesky & 
Taussig (2009) study. In terms of ownership types, 
government-owned firms are believed to be able to 
access finance from development banks or public-
owned banks (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2008), face fewer problem with collateral requirement 
and paperwork bureaucracy (Demirgüç-Kunt & Le-
vine, 2005) whereas private-owned firms are more 
likely to be credit rationed (Drakos & Giannakopou-
los, 2011). Private enterprises face significant con-
straints in terms of collateral requirement to access 
credit. In addition to firm size, age and ownership 
types, previous studies also include sector and export 
as dummy variables to test whether there is a differ-
ence in accessibility to finance in different sectors of 
the economy and between export and non-export en-
terprises. For instance, Kira & He (2012) indicated 
that firms in the industry sector can obtain debt 
finance much easier than other sectors in Tanzania. In 
contrast, Mulaga’s (2013) study indicated that manu-
facturing sector is more likely to use external finance 
than services and industry sector in Malawi. Beck et 
al. (2008), however, found no difference in debt fi-
nancing across sectors. With regard to SMEs in Viet-
nam, Le (2012) found that firms in the service sector, 
followed by some manufacturing industries have a 
higher probability to succeed in obtaining bank loans. 
However, Vietnamese firms participating in export 
experienced difficulties to access credit as suggested 
in Thanh, Cuong, Dung, & Chieu’s (2011) study. 
1.3. Creditworthiness. Collateral serves as a means 
to reduce asymmetric information and moral hazard 
in asset-based lending (Mac AnBhaird & Lucey, 
2010). Bester (1987) argued that collateral signals 
firm’s level of risk because only low risk borrowers 
are willing to pledge high amount of collateral. The 
lack of collateral is among the major barrier to access 
bank finance (Shinozaki, 2012). Empirical studies 
have proven that collateral increase accessibility to 
institutional finance (Fatoki & Asah, 2011; Fatoki & 
Odeyemi, 2010; Kira & He, 2012), long term debt 
finance (Bougheas, Mizen, & Yalcin, 2006), and also 
credit access in general (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). 
Malesky & Taussig (2009) used Certificate of Land 
Use Right (CLUR) in Vietnam as a proxy for colla-
teral and found that having CLUR indeed increases 
the ability to access to credit. Rand (2007) found 
opposing result whereby collateral is significant and 
positively correlated to interest rate, suggesting the 
influence of “policy lending” in the country credit 
market. 
In addition to collateral, quality of financial informa-
tion disclosed by firms is also one of the important 
determinants of accessibility to finance. According to 
Timo Baas Mechthild (2006), SMEs do not have 
much incentive to invest in publishing detailed finan-
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cial statements because legal accounting requirements 
are low; hence, banks are not willing to lend to them. 
However, financial statements issued by firms can be 
used to evaluate future performance and therefore 
determine whether borrowers are able to repay the 
interest and principal (Kira & He, 2012, p. 115; Mula-
ga, 2013; Osei-Assibey et al., 2012; Safavian & Wim-
pey, 2007). Furthermore, Drakos & Giannakopoulos 
(2011) added that externally audited financial state-
ment decreases the likelihood of being credit rationed 
which supports Shinozaki’s (2012) result. Le (2012) 
found that for small businesses in Vietnam, having 
financial statement audited is beneficial to obtain bank 
loans but it is not significant for larger enterprises.   
1.4. Networks. Networks play a crucial role, especial-
ly in relationship lending. Study on relationship lend-
ing emphasizes the role of trust on accessibility to 
credit in SMEs. According to Moro & Fink (2013), 
loan manager’s trust on firm will reduce credit con-
straints and increase accessibility to credits (Atieno, 
2009). It is widely agreed that networks are considered 
as an effective tool to overcome asymmetric informa-
tion (Dabla-Norris & Koeda, 2008; Fraser, Bhaumik, 
& Wright, 2013; Safavian & Wimpey, 2007; Shane & 
Cable, 2002). Long term relationships enable creditors 
to punish firms using fund ineffectively by cutting off 
future loan (Fraser et al., 2013). It also helps firms to 
borrow at lower rates and pledge less collateral (Berg-
er & Udell, 1995; Degryse & Van Cayseele, 2000; 
Uzzi, 1999). Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-
Solano (2010) found that relationships with banks help 
European SMEs access debt more easily but SMEs 
bear higher interest rate if they keep relationship with 
only one bank rather than two banks.  
However, networks or relationships appear to be more 
important to obtain informal finance and venture capi-
tal. Unlike formal creditors, informal creditors do not 
rely much on official information disclosed by firms 
such as financial statements or business plans but on 
informal information acquired through business rela-
tionship with borrowers (Dabla-Norris & Koeda, 
2008; Safavian & Wimpey, 2007). Moreover, net-
works with lenders, connections with other enterprises 
and business associations also help to promote access 
to financial services (Atieno, 2009). 
Few studies on SMEs in Vietnam have attempted to 
understand the relationship between network and ac-
cessibility to bank finance. Specifically, Nguyen & 
Ramachandran (2006) and Rand (2007) found that 
firms having borrowing relationship with banks pre-
viously are able to borrow at lower interest rate and a 
higher probability to obtain loan again. In Le, Sundar, 
& Nguyen’s (2006, pp. 222-223) study, firms that 
have networks with managers of other firms, with 
friends and relatives find it easier to borrow from 
banks. On the other hand, networks with government 
officials have negative effect on accessibility to bank 
finance, suggesting that these firms can access to aid 
money and government official programs. This find-
ing, however, contradicts Malesky & Taussig’s (2009) 
result where political connections strongly increased 
the probability of firms to obtain bank loans. 
2. Methodology  
2.1. Data. Data for analysis were collected from a 
survey of 700 SMEs in Hanoi in June, 2013. The 
questionnaire was pretested on a random sample of 10 
SME’s owners/managers in Hanoi. The respondents 
were encouraged to comment on any questions or 
statements they thought were ambiguous or unclear. 
Some minor wording modifications to the question-
naire were made as a result of this process. The final 
version of the questionnaire was then delivered to 
SMEs premises. SMEs owners or financial managers 
were asked to fill the questionnaire. Of the total 700 
questionnaires that were delivered, 487 returned res-
ponses were usable.  
Of the total 487 responses, 211 SMEs borrowed at 
least a loan while 276 SMEs did not borrow in 2012. 
However, some SMEs did not borrow simply because 
they did not need to (i.e., they had enough capital). 
Therefore, we excluded 158 SMEs that did not borrow 
from the model. The final data set for the model in-
cludes 211 SMEs that borrowed and 117 SMEs that 
were in need of a loan but did not get one, yielding a 
total of 328 observations. 
2.1.1. Empirical models. For many commodities and 
services, the individual’s choice is discrete and tradi-
tional demand theory has to be modified to analyze 
such a choice (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Kim, 
Widdows and Yilmazer, 2005). Models for determin-
ing discrete choice such as whether an individual pur-
chase a house or does not purchase a house is known 
as a qualitative choice model. If the random term is 
assumed to have a logistic distribution, then the deci-
sion to purchase or not purchase a house represents a 
standard binary logit model. However, if it is assumed 
that the random term is normally distributed, then the 
model becomes the binary probit model (Maddala, 
1993; Greene, 2000). 
The logit model is applied in this study to determine 
what factors affect the SMEs ability to access credit 
when they need to borrow (from any sources such as 
commercial banks, microfinance, friends/relatives, 
trade credit, etc.). Since the nature of the dependent 
variable (denoted as borrow versus not borrow) is 
binary, logistic estimation is used. In this study, we 
choose logit model because of its simplicity. The 
model is estimated by the maximum likelihood me-
thod used in the STATA software. 
The parametric functional form of the logit model 
with the binary dependent variable can be written as 
follows:  
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Borrowit = marriedit + genderit + age it + bachelorit + owner_expit + firm_ageit + size 2012it +  
+ sector 2 it + sector 3 it + exportit + combank_nwit + socbank_nwit + friend_nwit + 
+ customer_nwit + acc_bookit + ?i.                                                                                                                                                                                     (1) 
 
The discrete dependent variable, borrow is based on 
the question asked in the mail survey: ‘‘Did you bor-
row any loan in 2012?’’ The following factors such as 
marital status, age, gender, number of years in busi-
ness, number of years business establishment, number 
of employees, types of economic sector, duration of 
loans, mode of loan payment, total value of loan, pur-
pose of loan, collateral, loan assistance, sources of 
loan, networks and accounting record book were hy-
pothesized to influence the respondent’s decision to 
borrow. For example, as the respondent’s age increas-
es, does the probability of borrowing decrease? The 
variables used in the empirical model are defined in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Variable description 
Name Description 
married Dummy variable taking value of 1 if owner is married, 0 otherwise 
gender Dummy variable taking value of 1 if owner is male, 0 otherwise 
age Dummy variable taking value of 1 if owner is younger than 40 and 0 otherwise 
bachelor Dummy variable taking value of 1 if owner has at least a bachelor degree or higher and 0 otherwise 
owner_exp Number of years owner has been doing business 
firm_age Number of years of establishment 
size2012 Number of employees in 2012 
sector2 Dummy variable taking value of 1 if SME is in manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise 
sector3 Dummy variable taking value of 1 if SME is in service sector, 0 otherwise 
export Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the firm has direct export, 0 otherwise 
short_term Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan duration is less than 1 year, 0 otherwise 
long_term Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan duration is more than 5 years, 0 otherwise 
Monthly_paid Dummy variable taking value of 1 if interest payment mode is monthly, 0 otherwise 
loan_amount Total value of the loan in thousand VND 
loan_purpose Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan purpose is for a new investment project, 0 otherwise 
collateral Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan is collateralized, 0 otherwise 
loan_assist Dummy variable taking value of 1 if SMEs received any assistance to obtain the loan, 0 otherwise 
bank Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan borrowed from a commercial bank 
micro Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan borrowed from a microfinance institution 
moneylender Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan borrowed from a money lender 
friend Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan borrowed from friends/relatives 
combank_nw Network with commercial bank, on scale from 0 = "Not at all" to 5 = "very extensive" 
socbank_nw Network with social bank, on scale from 0 = "Not at all" to 5 = "very extensive" 
friend_nw Network with friends/relative, on scale from 0 = "Not at all" to 5 = "very extensive" 
customer_nw Network with customers, on scale from 0 = "Not at all" to 5 = "very extensive" 
acc_book Dummy variable taking value of 1 if SME has an accounting book, 0 otherwise 
 
In Table 2, we report the pairwise correlation of the 
independent variables used in the model. The result 
shows no statistically significant correlation at more 
than 0.55. We also ran the model using Ordinary Least 
Square method to calculate variance inflation factor 
(VIF). The result (not reported here but available upon 
request) shows that the average VIF was 1.39 with the 
highest VIF being 1.77. Our model did not suffered 
from multicollinearity.  
2.2. Descriptive statistics. Table 3 summarizes the 
mean statistics of the variables used in the model 
for all SMEs and the borrower/non-borrower 
group. The table shows the borrower group in-
cluded significantly younger, more experienced 
owners, had longer years of establishment, larger 
size, more prevalent accounting book and more 
extensive networks with bank. 
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2.3. Determinants of interest rate charged for the 
loan borrowed in 2012. The interest rate model fol-
lows Petersen & Rajan (1994), Uzzi (1999), and Rand 
(2007) studies and is given as follows: 
Where, indexes firm i. ITRi = interest rate for the larg-
est loan the firms borrowed in 2012. OWNERi = a set 
of variables representing owner’s/manager’s characte-
ristics, including age, gender, marital status, educa-
tional level, and experiences in doing business. FIRMi 
= a set of variables representing the firm’s characteris-
tics, including firm age; number of employees (proxy 
for firm’s size); a dummy variable for sector which 
equals to 1 if the firm is in either industry, trade or 
services, 0 otherwise; a dummy variable equals to 1 if 
firm exports, 0 otherwise. LOANi = a set of variables 
representing loan characteristics, including collateral 
dummy which equals to 1 if the loan required collater-
al and 0 otherwise; amount of the loan; duration of the 
loan; a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the mode 
of interest payment was monthly; and a dummy which 
equals to 1 if the loan purpose was to finance new 
investment project. RELATIONi = a dummy which 
equals to 1 if SMEs received any assistance to obtain 
the loan and 0 otherwise. SOURCEi = a set of dummy 
variables representing sources of finance, including 
bank finance, microfinance, money lenders, 
friends/relatives, and others, ei = error term. 
The mean statistics of the SMEs largest loan borrowed 
in 2012 classified by sources of financing is reported 
in Table 4. The table clearly displays a large variance 
in the interest rate charged by different lenders with 
the highest cost from private money lender and the 
lowest from friends/relatives. The difference between 
the commercial bank and microfinance loan interest 
rate is marginal. In terms of loan amount, commercial 
banks were the biggest lenders, followed by private 
money lenders. The mean of all microfinance loans 
was very high but it was caused by one outlier, i.e. one 
state-owned SME was able to borrow up to 90 billion 
VND from microfinance institutions. Interestingly, 
none of the loans borrowed from friends/relatives 
required collateral while the percentage of collatera-
lized loans was 90% for commercial banks and 75% 
for microfinance. In addition, commercial bank loan 
required the most assistance to obtain (42.8%). The 
mode of interest payment variable indicates that pay-
ing loan interest every month is the main method 
(68.5% for commercial bank, 75% for microfinance, 
80% for private money lender, and 53.8% 
friends/relative loans).  
Finally, in terms of the length of loans, Table 4 shows 
that most of the loans were made in short term or me-
dium term across different lenders, especially from the 
informal sources. For example, 80% of the loans pro-
vided by private money lenders and 64.3% from 
friends/relatives were short term. For commercial 
bank loans, 48% was short term and 42.8% was me-
dium term. The microfinance loan is a special case in 
which medium (41.7%) and long terms were dominant 
(33.3%). 
Table 4. Mean statistics of the largest loan characteristics 
Commercial banks Micro finance Private money lenders Friends/relatives 
Interest rate 14.992 14.167 21.250 8.125 
Short_term 0.480 0.250 0.80 0.643 
Medium term 0.428 0.417 0.2 0.25 
Long_term 0.092 0.333 0 0.107 
monthly_paid 0.684 0.750 0.80 0.538 
loan_purpose 0.289 0.250 0.40 0.107 
loan_amount 4.434.852.0 385.273.73 1.288.000.0 742.857.1 
collateral 0.901 0.750 0.500 0 
loan_assist 0.428 0.250 0.200 0.393 
Observations 152 12 10 28 
Percent 72.04 5.69 4.74 13.27 
Note: Short term (? 1 year); medium term (1-5 years); long term (> 5 years). 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Determinants of SMEs credit accessibility 
Result of the logistic estimation for the determi-
nants of credit accessibility for SMEs and mar-
ginal effect is presented in Table 5. The statisti-
cally significant factors affecting the SMEs’ abili-
ty to borrow include gender and education level 
of the owners/managers, firm size, sector, and 
network with banks and customers. 
Table 5. Result of the logistic estimation of credit accessibility determinants 
Borrow Coefficient Robust standart. error. Marginal effect dy/dx 
Owner characteristics 
age -0.355 0.331 -0.064d 
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Table 5 (cont.). Result of the logistic estimation of credit accessibility determinants 
Borrow Coefficient Robust standart. error. Marginal effect dy/dx 
gender 0.544* 0.298 0.106d 
married -0.619 0.419 -0.100d 
bachelor -0.775** 0.354 -0.128d 
owner_exp 0.006 0.035 0.001 
SMEs Characteristics 
firm_age 0.066 0.050 0.012 
size2012 0.046*** 0.015 0.008 
sector2 -0.281 0.495 -0.054d 
sector3 -0.487* 0.289 -0.091d 
export -0.511 0.463 -0.103d 
Networks 
combank_nw 0.380*** 0.096 0.070 
socbank_nw -0.149 0.109 -0.027 
friend_nw 0.001 0.090 0.000 
customer_nw -0.158* 0.087 -0.029 
Creditworthiness 
acc_book 0.102 0.458 0.019d 
_cons 0.394 0.796  
Number of observations 329   
Pseudo R2 0.2044   
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Marginal effects were calculated at the mean (d) dy/dx is for discrete 
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
?
Table 5 shows gender has a significant and positive 
effect on credit access. Being a male owner increases 
the probability of obtaining a loan by 10.6%. Our 
finding is similar with previous studies that revealed 
female-owned businesses have higher probability of 
being credit rationed (Drakos & Giannakopoulos, 
2011; Muravyev et al., 2009), obtaining less amount 
of the loans to start their business, using less institu-
tional finance (Sara & Peter, 1998) and more infor-
mal/micro finance (Akoten et al., 2006). Our result 
also supports Rand’s (2007) finding that Vietnamese 
female owned SMEs are more credit constraint than 
their male counterparts. 
The education variable yields somewhat surprising 
result. The result suggests that, the owner with a ba-
chelor degree or higher had 12.8% lower chance of 
borrowing a loan than he/she would otherwise have 
with lower educational level. The education variable is 
negatively related to credit accessibility which contra-
ditcs to what is reported in the literature (Coleman, 
2004b; Fatoki & Asah, 2011; Fatoki & Odeyemi, 
2010; Nofsinger & Wang, 2011; Osei-Assibey et al., 
2012). Our result contradicts with Le, Sundar, & 
Nguyen (2006) study that showed positive educational 
influence the owner’s probability of obtaining bank 
loans. Thanh, Cuong, Dung, & Chieu’s (2011) study 
showed non-significant relationship between owner 
education and credit accessibility. However, our result 
strongly supports Coleman (2004b) and Rand’s  
(2007) finding who explained that owners with better 
knowledge are more likely to know if their loan appli-
cation will be rejected. Therefore, they choose not to 
apply in the first place.  
Table 5 also shows that higher educated own-
ers/managers are not likely to anticipate difficulties in 
obtaining a loan (such as rejection of application, 
complicated government regulations or administrative 
difficulties in processing the loan) but they are also 
more cautious in making business decisions, including 
whether to borrow or not to borrow. About 38% of the 
surveyed SMEs did not borrow because they either 
anticipated complicated government regulations 
or administrative difficulties in processing the 
loans which increase the opportunity costs of 
obtaining a loan. 
The owner’s age coefficient is negative which sup-
ports Coleman (2004b) and Vos et al. (2007) studies 
that younger owners are less risk averse so they are 
more willing to borrow. Similarly, the marital status 
and owner experience coefficients are not statistically 
significant.  
With regard to SMEs characteristic variables, firm size 
and sector are significant determinants of credit acces-
sibility. The firm size coefficient is positively related 
to the probability to borrow. Our estimation suggests 
that an additional employee added to the firm increas-
es the probability of the firm to borrow a loan by 
0.8%. This result is similar to other studies in develop-
ing countries such as China (Okura, 2008), Malawi 
(Mulaga, 2013), South Africa (Fatoki & Odeyemi, 
2010), Kenya (Biggs, Raturi, & Srivastava, 2002), 
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India (Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, & Qian, 2012), 
Mozambique (Byiers et al., 2010), Tanzania (Kira & 
He, 2012), the UK and US (Vos et al., 2007), and 
Vietnam (Le, 2012; Malesky & Taussig, 2009; 
Nguyen & Ramachandran, 2006; Rand, 2007). In 
terms of sector, firms in the service sector have lower 
probability to borrow by 9% as compared to industry 
and trade. This is common since manufacturing is 
provided more favorable and incentive treatments 
from the Vietnamese government toward an industria-
lized economy. The accounting book availability coef-
ficient (used as proxy for creditworthiness) exhibited 
the expected sign but was not statistically significant. 
Table 5 also indicates that network with bank officials 
is beneficial to obtain a loan. An increase in one level 
of network with bank officials increased the probabili-
ty to obtain a loan by 7% and is statistically significant 
at 1%. Network with social bank official’s variable is 
not statistically significant, indicating that microfin-
ance is not popular in the urban area. The result re-
veals that a more extensive network with customers 
reduces the probability to obtain a loan. It is unders-
tandable that when a firm can utilize its network with 
customers, the business is more likely to be successful 
and therefore it can rely more on retain earnings. Net-
work with friends is also positively related to borrow-
ing but this coefficient is not statistically significant. In 
summary, there are only two networks that matter to 
SMEs credit accessibility: network with bank officials 
and network with customers. The first network im-
proves their chance to get a loan and the second lessen 
their debt incidence.  
3.2. Determinants of the SMEs loan interest rate. 
Result from the OLS estimation for the determinants 
of SMEs loan interest rate is shown in Table 6. The 
table presents the model with different set of variables 
but the results do not vary significantly, illustrating 
that it does not suffer from multicollinearity. Using 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), the result exhibits the 
most appropriate predictor subset. The result sug-
gests that the important determinants of loan inter-
est rate are loan characteristics, relationship, and 
source of the loan.  
Table 6 shows the firm age coefficient is significant 
and negatively related to interest rate. This finding is 
consistent with Diamond (1989) theory of reputation 
acquisition effect as firms grow older. It also confirms 
the downward sloping interest rate curve as a function 
of firm age in Sakai, Uesugi, and Watanabe (2010) 
empirical test of firms in Japan. The result also shows 
that SMEs in manufacturing sector paid higher interest 
rate than services, trade and agriculture sector. This 
seems somewhat contradictory when SMEs in manu-
facturing find it easier to obtain loans than other enter 
 
prises in services and trade but paid higher interest 
rate. A possible explanation is that the privilege in 
obtaining bank loan is offset by the higher cost of 
commercial bank loans as compared to lower cost 
sources such as friends and relatives or trade credits. 
The result further reveals that 76.5% industrial SMEs 
in our sample chose commercial bank loan for their 
largest loan compared to 64% SMEs in the service 
sector. Furthermore, of the total number of SMEs that 
borrowed from friends or relative, only 14% are from 
manufacturing sector while the remaining 86% are 
from services or trade sector. Other firm characteris-
tics variables, including number of employees and 
export participation are not statistically significant.   
In terms of the loan characteristic, the result shows 
mode of interest payment is not a statistically signifi-
cant determinant of interest rate but duration of the 
loan, loan amount and purpose of the loan are impor-
tant. First, duration of the loan is negatively related to 
the interest rate with long term (more than 5 years) 
loan being significantly cheaper than short term loan 
(less than 5 years). This is because interest rate was 
very volatile and unpredictable in 2012. The financial 
market in Vietnam is heavily regulated and controlled 
by the government and the market interest rate varies 
upon government policies on prime rates, discount 
rate, and refinancing rate. In 2012 alone, the State 
Bank of Vietnam changed these rates six times, cut-
ting the refinancing rate from 15% per year at the 
beginning to 9% by the end of the year and the dis-
count rate from 12% to 7%. It is the declining interest 
rate set by the government over a short period of time 
that creates a falling interest rate expectation, making 
the long term interest rate cheaper than the short term. 
Secondly, as expected, the loan amount is positively 
associated with the interest rate charged. This is statis-
tically significant at 1% level. In addition, the loan to 
finance new investment project has higher interest rate 
than other purposes because investing in a new project 
is considered riskier than other activities. This is poss-
ible from our sample survey where 40% of the loans 
borrowed from private money lenders were for new 
investment project while only less than 29% of com-
mercial bank and other source loans were for new 
investment purposes. Interestingly, our finding differs 
from Rand’s (2007) study in which the author finds a 
positive relationship between collateral and cost of 
capital for SMEs in Vietnam. A possible explanation 
for the difference in our result is the difference in the 
target SMEs population. Our study concentrates on 
SMEs in urban area, while majority of SMEs that 
accessed credit in Rand’s (2007) study came from 
rural area where policy lending (i.e. the government 
directs state-owned commercial banks to lend to rural 
SMEs without or with very low collateral require-
ment) is popular. 
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The sources of financing and relationship variables 
yields expected result. The most expensive source of 
financing is from private money lender, followed by 
commercial bank loan and microfinance. Borrowing 
from friends or relative is least costly but the variable 
is not statistically significant. SMEs that received 
assistance in obtaining the loan also paid lower inter-
est rate. Our findings are similar to Rand (2007). 
Table 6. Determinants of interest rate charged on SMEs loan 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Owner characteristics 
married 1.108 (1.019) 
gender 0.501 (0.669) 0.432 (0.664) 
age 0.460 (0.800) 0.341 (0.792) 0.328 (0.790) 
bachelor 1.176 (0.858) 1.136 (0.852) 1.218 (0.869) 1.225 (0.860)
owner_exp -0.0408 (0.059) -0.0387 (0.059) -0.0388 (0.059) -0.038 (0.050)
SMEs characteristics 
firm_age -0.124** (0.0610) -0.123** (0.062) -0.124** (0.0621) -0.137** (0.0617) 
size2012 0.0062 (0.0045) 0.0062 (0.0045) 0.006 (0.0047) 0.009* (0.0048) 
sector2 1.523* (0.873) 1.549* (0.866) 1.609* (0.868) 1.731** (0.865)
sector3 1.142 (0.739) 1.050 (0.745) 1.080 (0.752) 1.098 (0.734)
export 1.021 (0.968) 0.863 (0.977) 0.832 (0.976) 0.820 (0.977)
Loan characteristics 
short_term 0.572 (0.705) 0.522 (0.711) 0.547 (0.711) 0.536 (0.715)
long_term -1.485* (0.826) -1.505* (0.841) -1.478* (0.841) -1.469* (0.840)
monthly_paid -0.035 (0.737) -0.0099 (0.747) -0.041 (0.744) 0.119 (0.745)
loan_amount 1.71e-08*** (4.54e-09) 1.83e-08*** (4.56e-09) 1.81e-08*** (4.58e-09) 1.63e-08*** (4.70e-09) 
loan_purpose 1.686** (0.699) 1.571** (0.707) 1.572** (0.706) 1.434** (0.712)
collateral -0.937 (1.134) -1.004 (1.144) -0.840 (1.129) -0.999 (1.133)
Relationship         
loan_assist -1.728** (0.671) -1.823*** (0.659) -1.815*** (0.655) -1.772*** (0.646)
Sources of financing 
bank 5.000*** (1.569) 5.202*** (1.655) 5.060*** (1.626) 3.911** (1.892)
micro 4.259** (1.809) 4.471** (1.869) 4.387** (1.852) 3.231 (2.089)
moneylender 9.937*** (2.152) 10.08*** (2.182) 10.01*** (2.160) 8.925*** (2.304)
friend -1.744 (1.840) -1.723 (1.903) -1.751 (1.891) -2.882 (2.103)
Constant 8.636*** (2.117) 9.701*** (1.796) 9.964*** (1.653) 11.26*** (1.693)
Observations 206 206 206 207 
R-squared 0.420 0.415 0.414 0.406 
AIC 1196.651 1196.334 1194.699 1203.758 
BIC 1269.864 1266.219 1261.257 1266.988 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
Conclusions 
This study identifies the determinants of credit acces-
sibility and loan interest rate for SMEs in Vietnam in 
2012. Owner characteristics, in particular, educational 
level and gender remain the most important factors in 
determining the access to credit, followed by SMEs 
relationship with banks and customers. Further, the 
results revealed that smaller sized enterprises have less 
access to credit. With regards to the loan interest rate, 
the owner characteristics variables are non-significant. 
The most expensive source of financing is from pri-
vate money lender, followed by commercial bank loan 
and microfinance. SMEs borrowed at lower rate if 
they operate longer in the market, receive assistance 
from government or if the loan is long term. On the 
other hand, interest rate is higher when the loan 
 
amount is larger, the purpose of loan is for new in-
vestment projects, or if SMEs were in manufacturing 
or construction sector. 
The study results recommend that network, relation-
ship and connections still have great effect over the 
SMEs credit market in Vietnam and there persist dis-
advantages for small sized and female-owned enter-
prises in obtaining a loan. Therefore, any policy that 
targets to improve SMEs credit accessibility should 
pay more attention to these two groups of borrowers. 
In addition, a stable monetary policy is necessary to 
enable SMEs credit market to be driven by market 
factors (such as creditworthiness) rather than non-
market factors such as relationships, sector or owner’s 
demographic characteristics. 
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